High Court OKs Sex Discrimination

“Ain’t I a Woman?”

An all-male majority on the U.S. Supreme Court has sanctioned insidious sex discrimination in the Hobby Lobby case.

In its decision, the majority states that a privately-held for-profit corporation does not have to follow federal regulations requiring employers to provide workers with an  insurance plan that includes, among other things,  no-cost contraceptives. The majority upheld Hobby Lobby‘s religious objection to paying for contraceptives. lodged under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  So Hobby Lobby does not have to provide no-cost contraceptives under its insurance plan.

Only women use the contraceptives at issue in the Hobby Lobby case.

Justice Samuel Alito, who wrote the majority opinion,  refers to the issue of discrimination in the context of  fears that an employer might lodge a religious objections involving race discrimination.  For example, suppose a restaurant owner doesn’t want to serve blacks for religious reasons. Justice Alito writes:

“The principal dissent raises the possibility that discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of race, might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal sanction. Our decision today provides no such shield. The Government has a compelling interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal.”

Okay, so the Court makes it clear it will not countenance religious objections that are based on race discrimination.  But why then has the Court approved religious objections that are  based on sex discrimination?

Continue reading “High Court OKs Sex Discrimination”

Company Liable for Lovestruck HR Director

A federal appeals court in Puerto Rico has rejected the narrow limitations imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court on who is considered to be a “supervisor” in employment discrimination cases.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that Developers Diversified Realty Corp (DDR) can be held liable for sexual harassment by Rosa Martinez, an HR officer for the company, who engineered the ouster of Antonio Velázquez-Pérez, a company regional general manager, after he rebuffed her advances.

Both Martinez and Velázquez worked in the Puerto Rico offices of DDR, a shopping center management company based in Ohio.

In its ruling , the appeals court acknowledged that the U.S. Supreme Court last year limited employer liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in cases where a non-supervisor causes a discriminatory action. Martinez was not Velázquez’ supervisor.  However, the 1st Circuit court said, DDR should have known that Martinez’s recommendation that Velázquez be fired was the product of discriminatory animus and therefore can be held liable under Title VII for negligently allowing Martinez to cause Velázquez’s termination.

Noting the case presented issues that it had not addressed previously. the appeals court concluded that an employer can be held liable if  the co-worker acted for discriminatory reasons with the intent to cause the plaintiff’s firing; the co-worker’s actions were in fact the proximate cause of the termination; and the employer allowed the co-worker’s acts to achieve their desired effect though it knew (or reasonably should have known) of the discriminatory motivation.

The Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Velázquez’s claim of sexual discrimination in violation of Title VII.

According the  opinion, Velázquez and Martinez had mutually flirted with each other when they both went to a company meeting in April 2008 and stayed at the same hotel. That night, Velázquez was walking with two female employees of the company when Martinez appeared in their path and asked where they were going.  Martinez followed Velázquez to his room,  tried to force her way in and refused to leave until Velázquez threatened to call security.  She then telephoned hm several times and sent a jealous email to one of the women that he had been walking with.  Shortly thereafter, Martinez threatened to have Velázquez fired, stating, “I don’t have to take revenge on anyone; if somebody knows your professional weaknesses, that person is me.”

Velázquez complained about Martinez’s behavior to his supervisor, who advised him to send her a “conciliatory” email because “[s]he’s going to get you terminated.” He and another male employee then jokingly suggested that Velázquez have sex with Martinez.

Martinez began a campaign of harsh criticism of Velázquez’s work, culminating with a recommendation that he be terminated. The top company official in Puerto Rico suggested that instead of termination Velázquez be issued a formal warning and placed on a Performance Improvement Plan.  Martinez went over his head and complained to two senior officials at the company’s headquarters in Ohio.

Meanwhile, Velázquez and Martinez went to another business meeting and stayed at the same hotel.  This time Martinez followed Velázquez into an elevator and said  she loved him and “wanted to have a romantic relationship with him.” Velázquez refused. That night, Martinez sent an email to the Ohio officials recommending that Velázquez be terminated immediately “because his behavior has been against the company code of conduct and has already impacted the trust form other team members.”

Four days later, on August 25, 2008, Velázquez was terminated for “[a]bsenteeism,” “[f]ailure to report,” and “[u]nsatisfactory performance.”

Appeals Ct Sides with EEOC in Conciliation Dispute

A federal appeals court in Chicago has departed from several other federal circuits by ruling that judicial review is not appropriate over efforts by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission  to settle employment discrimination complaints.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act directs the EEOC  to try to negotiate an end to an employer’s unlawful employment practices before it seeks a judicial remedy but it does not require the EEOC to actually reach a settlement.

Nevertheless, several federal appeals courts have allowed employers to raise an affirmative defense in employment discrimination cases that the EEOC failed to engage in good faith settlement negotiations  prior to filing a lawsuit. This is referred to as a “failure-to-conciliate” defense.

A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago ruled last week that an implied failure-to-conciliate defense would add an “unwarranted mechanism” in Title VII by which employers could avoid liability for unlawful discrimination. “They can do so through protracted and ultimately pointless litigation over whether the EEOC tried hard enough to settle,” said the panel.

In addition, the panel said, the implied failure-to-conciliate defense runs “flatly contrary to the broad statutory prohibition on using what was said and done during the conciliation process  ‘as evidence in a subsequent proceeding.’”

Six other federal circuits – the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits –  allow some form of judicial review over the sufficiency or good faith of the EEOC’s conciliation efforts.

The 7th Circuit ruling came in a 2008 sex discrimination case filed against Mach Mining, which  allegedly refused to hire female applicants  for coal mining jobs. After investigating, the EEOC found there was reasonable cause to believe Mach had discriminated against a class of female job applicants at its Johnston City site. The EEOC engaged in informal conciliation with Mach but in 2011 the EEOC concluded the parties could not agree and filed a lawsuit.

Mach argued the suit should be dismissed because the EEOC failed to conciliate in good faith.  The EEOC did not contend that its efforts were either sincere or reasonable, only that they were not reviewable as a defense to unlawful discrimination.

The 7th Circuit panel said the U.S. Congress gave the EEOC broad discretion to negotiate as it sees fit, including the power to accept or reject any offer or proposed settlement for any reason.  “Nor can Mach Mining explain just how many offers, counteroffers, conferences, or phone calls should be necessary to satisfy judicial review, despite repeated invitations to provide the court with a workable standard,” it added.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed a brief in the case arguing that it was necessary to keep the EEOC on a tight leash to avoid “agency shenanigans” but the 7th Circuit panel noted the EEOC  filed only 122 merit lawsuits in 2012.  “That so few unsuccessful efforts at conciliation end up in court shows how constrained the agency is by practical limits of budget and personnel,” said the appeals court.

The panel remanded the case, EEOC v. Mach Mining, No. 13-2456,  to the lower court for further proceedings.

In brutally harsh decision last fall in  EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc.,  Chief Judge Linda R. Reade of the U.S. District Court of Iowa ruled  that the  EEOC  must pay CRST, one of the nation’s leading transport companies,  a judgment of $4,694,422.14  stemming from a lawsuit filed by the EEOC alleging sex discrimination.  Judge Reade dismissed at least 67 class members from that case because the EEOC’s allegedly failed to conciliate with CRST with respect to each individual class member.

Judge Whacks EEOC With $4.7 in Fees

Case of Female Truck Drivers Crashes and Burns

It’s easy to forget that EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc. started with a 2005 sex discrimination complaint by a female truck driver trainee, Monika Starke, who said she was sexually harassed  by her two “Lead Trainers.”

 Chief Judge Linda R. Reade of the U.S. District Court of Iowa ruled recently that the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission must pay CRST, one of the nation’s leading transport companies,  $4,694,422.14 in attorney fees and costs stemming from the case.

Judge Reade’s decision  is brutally unsympathetic to the EEOC and the  255 female trainees and drivers who alleged sex discrimination and harassment against CRST.  She appears to be much more concerned about the supposedly unfair burden the litigation placed on CRST. 

The case began with a sex discrimination lawsuit filed by the EEOC on behalf of Starke and other similarly situated employees.  

 Court records show that Monika Starke alleged that one of the CRST trainers told her “the gear stick is not the penis of my husband, I don’t have to touch the gear stick so often”  and “You got big tits for your size, etc. . . “  She said she told him she was not interested in a sexual relationship with him and called the CRST dispatcher to complain.   “[I] was told that I could not get off the truck until the next day.”  she said.

 Starke’s other “Lead Trainer”  allegedly forced Starke to have sex with him while traveling from July 18, 2005 through August 3, 2005  “in order to get a passing grade.”

 Starke is described as a German who struggles with English. She and her  husband subsequently hired a lawyer and filed for bankruptcy.  They failed  to mention  the CRST lawsuit, prompting CRST to file a motion to prevent Starke from proceeding against CRST on grounds of judicial estoppel –  a doctrine that is meant to protect the integrity of the court.  Judge Reade granted the motion.

 In fact, Judge Reade granted CRST’s pre-trial motions to dismiss all of the complaints of sexual harassment and discrimination filed by the EEOC against CRST. 

  In a dozen cases, Judge Reade said the complaints were not “severe or pervasive” enough.

  In other cases, Judge Reade said CRST did not have legal (as opposed to real)  notice of the harassment and the “Lead Drivers” – who evaluated the performance of the female trainees – did not fall within the court’s technical definition of  supervisor in that they could not fire the trainees.

 Judge Reade dismissed 67 cases because the EEOC did not attempt to conciliate or negotiate with the CRST to settle the cases –  which appears to be a brand  new requirement that could severely limit the  EEOC in the future. Judge Reade conceded that dismissal was a  “severe” sanction for these complainants.

 The EEOC appealed Judge Reade’s dismissal of the case  to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit.

Appeals Court

In its decision, the  Eigth Circuit agreed that the “Lead Drivers” are not supervisory employees and that CRST was not vicariously liable for sexual harassment/discrimination committed by these employees.  

 The  appellate court generally agreed that claims by female complainants that they were propositioned for sex by male trainers and drivers were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile work environment claim. The Court said an individual must show “more than a few isolated incidents” to support such a claim.  (It was unclear exactly how many times  a worker must be propositioned for sex to qualify as being harassed.)

 However, the appeals court disagreed with the dismissal of the claims of three female plaintiffs and ordered them reinstated. The court also reversed Judge Reade’s earlier grant of attorney fees to CRST in the amount of $4,560,285.11.

One of the three employees whose case was reinstated was Sherry O’Donnell,  who spent  seven days on the road with a male co-driver who asked her on three to five occasions to drive naked;  refused her request to stop at a truck stop so she could go to the bathroom,  ordering her instead to urinate in the parking lot; and, “in a culminating incident grabbed O’Donnell’s face while she was driving and began screaming that ‘all he wanted was a girlfriend.’ Regarding this third incident, O’Donnell testified that Sears grabbed her face so vigorously that it caused one of her teeth to lacerate her lip.”

Her lead trainer began screaming that ‘all he wanted was a girlfriend.’ He grabbed her face so vigorously that he caused one of her teeth to lacerate her lip.

 The other complainant, Tillie Jones, testified that during a two-week training trip, her Lead Driver, wore only underwear in the cab and on several occasions rubbed the back of her head, despite her repeated requests that he stop. He allegedly referred to Jones as  “his bitch” five or six times and, when Jones’s complained about his slovenly habits, ordered Jones to clean up the truck, declaring “that’s what you’re on the truck for, you’re my bitch. I ain’t your bitch. Shut up and clean it up.”  Like many of CRST’s Lead Drivers, Jones said he routinely urinated in plastic bottles and ziplock bags while in transit, leaving  his urine receptacles about the truck’s cab for her to clean up.  

 The appeals court ruled the EEOC established material issues of fact regarding the harassment that O’Donnell and Jones allegedly suffered. “We hold that the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that the harassment they suffered was insufficiently severe or pervasive,” the court said.

 Finally, the Court rejected Judge Reade’s finding that the EEOC itself was barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel from proceeding on Monika Starke’s behalf, noting the EEOC had not misrepresented any facts to the court.  That brought Ms. Starke case back into the litigation.

 After the appeals court’s decision, CRST agreed to pay Ms. Starke $50,000 to settle Ms. Starke’s case, which most people would interpret as a victory for Ms. Starke. 

 The EEOC decided it could not proceed with respect to O’Donnell complaint, citing the “law of the case.” This presumably refers to Judge Reade’s ruling that the EEOC was required to directly engage in “conciliation” with CRST on each complaint.  

 Which left Ms. Jones as the sole surviving plaintiff.

Even though  the appeals court ruled in the EEOC’s favor with respect to several issues, Judge Reade ruled CRST was the ‘prevailing party” in the case and was entitled to almost $5 million in fees and costs.

 The final award to CRST is actually larger than the earlier award by Judge because Judge Reade included fees and costs expended by CRST related to the appeal.

 Judge Reade was appointed to the federal court in 2002 after being nominated by President George W. Bush.

 

Walmart Dodges Bullet on Sex Discrimination

Scale of JusticeWal-Mart may have dodged the bullet for alleged systemic sex discrimination dating back at least a decade.

Last week a federal judge in San Francisco denied class certification in a statewide class action lawsuit filed by five female Wal-Mart employees in California on behalf of 150,000 past and present female workers in that state who  allegedly were denied equal treatment in pay and promotions.

This is the second defeat for plaintiffs seeking to file class action lawsuits against Wal-Mart on a state or regional basis. Wal-Mart won dismissal of a lawsuit in October that sought to represent female Wal-Mart workers in Texas.

 The U.S. Supreme Court last year rejected a 12-year-old class action lawsuit filed by six female employees of Wal-Mart on behalf of  1.6 million past and present female workers around the country. 

What’s left for the plaintiffs?

Class action lawsuits often are the only realistic way of addressing systematic discrimination by corporations because of  the high cost of litigation, the defendant’s “deep pockets,”  and the relatively paltry amount of damages typically available in individual cases.

Underwhelmed

Senior U.S. District Judge Charles R. Breyer ruled the California lawsuit failed to meet the  U.S. Supreme Court’s criteria for a collective legal action, including evidence of a company policy or decisions by higher-ups that affect all workers in the class. He the statistics “still do not reflect significant proof of a general policy of discrimination.”

Judge Breyer concluded the following evidence from the plaintiff’s is “underwhelming”:

  • About three-quarters of the stores paid women, on average, the same hourly rates as men. (Note: of course, this means that a quarter of Wal-Mart stores pay women, on average, a lower hourly rate than men. PGB)
  • Eighty-six female Wal-Mart employees in California described personal experiences of discrimination  – that represents only one woman for every 1,745 members of the proposed statewide class. (It’s unclear what number would be sufficient  for class action status- PGB)
  • The plaintiff’s produced evidence that Wal-Mart’s then-chief executive, Thomas Coughlin, in a 2004 meeting attended by district managers who approve pay and promotional decisions, said the key to success in choosing leaders was “a single focus to get the job done,” and that “men are better at focus.”
  • The plaintiffs said they had evidence of disparities throughout California and biased statements by top managers.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously in June 2011 that the original lawsuit against Wal-Mart in 2001 failed to show any company-wide policy or attitude of discrimination  and said there were too many women in too many jobs at Wal-Mart to wrap into one lawsuit. The high court overturned lower court decisions that allowed nationwide class-action status.

Judge Breyer said the California lawsuit “is essentially a scaled-down version of the (nationwide) case with new labels on old arguments.” He said the plaintiffs challenged “the discretionary decisions of hundreds of decision-makers,” which, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, cannot be the basis of a class-action suit.  

Breyer said the remarks attributed to former Wal-Mart CEO Coughlin may have come from an outside consultant and were made after the period covered by the lawsuit.

Breyer, 72, was appointed to the federal bench in 1997 by then-President Bill Clinton.  His brother is U.S. Supreme Court  Justice Stephen Breyer.

Dodged a Bullet?

At one point, Wal-Mart, the nation’s leading retailer, was concerned about potentially serious liability for alleged sex discrimination.

In  2010, the New York Times published an article on a 1995 memorandum issued by Wal-Mart’s then counsel, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld,  that reported widespread gender disparities in pay and promotion at Wal-Mart and Sam’s Club stores.

The NYT reported the memo said that “women employed by Wal-Mart earned less than men in numerous job categories, with men in salaried jobs earning 19 percent more than women..”

By one measure, the memo states “. . . men were five and a half times as likely as women to be promoted into salaried, management positions.” Furthermore, in 1993, men employed by Wal-Mart as department managers were paid an hourly rate 5.8 percent higher than women in those positions. 

The Memo estimated that Wal-Mart’s potential legal exposure in a class-action sex discrimination suit was $185 million to $740 million for 1993 alone.

The  overall disparities in job assignments, the memo states, were “statistically significant and sufficient to warrant a finding of discrimination unless the company can demonstrate at trial that the statistical disparities are caused by legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors.”

At this point it appears that Wal-Mart has dodged that bullet.

Wal-Mart was “pleased” by California Judge Breyer’s ruling and said it has a had a  “strong policy” against discrimination in place for many years.

Mediation Goes Awry for Worker

After Outburst, He Won’t See Employer in Court

There is a new way for a worker to lose a lawsuit in federal court.

A three-judge panel of the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago, IL, ruled recently that a worker could be fired for misbehaving during a mediation session called to resolve his complaint of sex discrimination.

Michael Benes had charged his Wisconsin employer, A.B. Data, Ltd. with sexgaveldiscrimination after working for the company for four months.

 The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission arranged for mediation in which, after an initial joint session, the parties separated into different rooms and a go-between relayed offers.

Upon receiving a settlement proposal that he thought too low, court papers say Benes “stormed” into the room used by A.B. Data Ltd. representatives, and said loudly: “You can take your proposal and shove it up your ass and fire me and I’ll see you in court.”

The company accepted Benes’ counterproposal but then fired him.

Retaliation

Benes filed suit under the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–3(a), which bans retaliation because a person “has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” [Emphasis supplied].

A magistrate judge upheld Benes’ dismissal, finding that Benes was fired for misconduct during the mediation, not for making or supporting a charge of discrimination.

The appeals court agreed and upheld Benes termination.

In the past, Benes’ misbehavior might have resulted in a sanction by the court or his employer.

Ignores the Employer’s Behavior

An opinion written by Chief Judge Frank A. Easterbrook states – without explanation – that Benes “abandoned” his claim of sex discrimination upon filing the retaliation complaint. This is somewhat baffling in that the original complaint of sex discrimination obviously was the underlying basis for the retaliation complaint.  Benes would never have been engaged in mediation if he had not filed the discrimination complaint. And Benes would not have been fired if he had not engaged in mediation.

The appellate panel proceeded to completely ignore A.B. Data’s  behavior and to focus only upon Benes’ conduct. 

Judge Easterbrook said Benes’ actions constituted a “serious breach” of the mediation protocol, adding, “If A.B. Data would have fired a person who barged into his superior’s office in violation of instructions, and said what Benes did, then it was entitled to fire someone who did the same thing during a mediation.”

The appellate panel said that Title VII does not establish a “privilege to misbehave” in mediation.

Chief Judge Easterbrook writes that the prospect of being fired for an egregious violation of a mediator’s protocols would not discourage a reasonable worker from making a charge of discrimination or from participating in the EEOC’s investigation.

Impact of Harassment

The details of the alleged discrimination suffered by Benes were not included in the appellate decision, nor are the details of the offer submitted by A.B. Data to resolve Benes’ complaint.

Those of us who work in the area of workplace bullying and abuse are familiar with the well-documented mental and physical stress suffered by targets over time, which occasionally results in erratic or self-defeating behavior. For these and other reasons,  mediation is not ideal in these cases.

Benes clearly did himself no favors with his hotheaded behavior. Still, this decision appears to be yet another indicator of the lack of sympathy for the problem of workplace abuse in the federal courts, where, coincidentally,  judges have lifetime tenure.

Research shows that employment discrimination cases are dismissed at a far higher rate than other types of cases in federal courts before they ever reach a jury.

Workers beware – any breach of civility on your part at any point in the proceedings can have severe consequences. 

Still OK to Fire Irresistable Attraction

The all-male Supreme Court of Iowa has upheld its earlier decision that a dentist did not discriminate when he fired his long-time dental hygienist whom he found to be an irresistible attraction. 

 In its decision, the Court focused upon the purported reason that the dentist fired the hygienist, rather than the dentist’s behavior. 

The Court said the legal question it must decide was: “Can a male employer terminate a long-time female employee because the employer’s wife, due to no fault of the employee, is concerned about the nature of the relationship between the employer and the employee?” 

The Court concluded that Dr. James H. Knight did nothing illegal when he fired  hygienist Melissa Nelson because Knight’s wife insisted that he do so –  not because of sex discrimination.

The Court upheld the firing last December but agreed to reconsider the case after a the ruling was widely criticized. (Ms. Nelson appeared in a skit lampooning the decision  on  Comedy Central.)  At that time, this blog observed that employees  often have little protections against discriminatory behavior when the employer is the boss.

Even though  Knight admitted that  the alleged threat to his marriage would not have existed if Nelson were male, the Iowa Court said the record did not support a conclusion that Knight took an adverse employment action against  Nelson “because of a gender-specific characteristic.” 

Nelson, who worked for  Knight, for about ten years,  alleged he violated the Iowa Civil Rights Act because she would not have been fired if she had been male.

The Court said Knight’s motive for firing Nelson was his desire to allay his wife’s concerns over Nelson’s “perceived”  threat to their marriage. “The civil rights laws seek to insure that employees are treated the same regardless of their sex or other protected status … , Dr. Knight’s unfair decision to terminate Nelson (while paying her a rather ungenerous one month’s severance) does not jeopardize that goal,” said the Court.

Nelson, who was 20 when she began working for Knight in 1999, denied ever flirting with Knight and said she considered him to be a friend and father figure.

 During the last year and a half of her employment, Knight began making sexual comments to her. Among other things, he complained that her clothing was too tight and asking her to put on a lab coat.  Knight acknowledged he told Nelson that “if she saw his pants bulging, she would know her clothing was too revealing.”

Nelson and Knight began texting during the last six months of Nelson’s employment.  Knight admits he asked her how often she experienced an orgasm. The Court found it significant that Nelson, who did not answer the text, “does not remember ever telling Dr. Knight not to text her or telling him that she was offended.”

Knight’s wife, Jeanne, discovered that Knight and Nelson were texting and demanded that he terminate Nelson’s employment because Nelson “was a big threat to our marriage.”

In both of its rulings the Court upheld a pre-trial ruling by a lower court judge, who granted Knight’s request for summary judgment in Nelson v. Knight, No. 11–1857 (Dec. 21, 2012).. Thus, the Court has twice concluded that there is absolutely no way that a jury could legally  decide against Knight and hold in favor Nelson. The Court’s holding means that there will be no trial in the case.

The Court notes that Nelson, did not file a sexual harassment lawsuit. or allege a hostile work environment.

 

Oregon Interns Get Harrassment/Discrimination Protection

InternsUnpaid interns are especially vulnerable to predatory behavior in the workplace because they are young and inexperienced.

However, many courts have ruled that unpaid interns are not protected by state and federal harassment and discrimination laws.

This week the Oregon legislature agreed to extend workplace protections against harassment and discrimination to unpaid interns.  These protections formerly were reserved only for employees.

The Oregon Senate unanimously passed HB 2669, sending it to Gov. John Kitzhaber for signature. The Oregon house unanimously passed the bill last month. Kitzhaber has indicated that he will sign the bill. 

The new law will give unpaid interns legal recourse against employers for workplace violations including sexual harassment; discrimination based on race, color, religion, gender, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status or age; and retaliation for whistleblowing, among other things.

With no protection in state law, you might think that unpaid interns could turn to federal law. You’d be wrong.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has issued  guidelines that provide coverage to volunteers under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “if the volunteer work is required for regular employment or regularly leads to employment with the same entity.”  However, unpaid interns have been unable to bring sexual harassment or civil rights complaints under Title VII  because judges have not found them to be “employees”  to whom protections are explicitly afforded.

According to a  2010 study by the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), federal courts have consistently found that the question of whether an individual is compensated for his or her work by an employer is the first test for determining employee status. Accordingly, unpaid interns, or even interns paid by an entity other than an employer, do not receive workplace discrimination protection.

The EPI study reports that the leading precedent for the failure to protect unpaid interns is the case of O’Connor v. Davis,  126 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1997).  Bridget O’Connor was required to complete an internship for her college degree and chose to work at a local psychiatric center. There, O’Connor allegedly was subject to repeated sexual harassment by one of her supervisors, Dr. James Davis. The district court summarily dismissed O’Connor’s complaint because the plaintiff, as an unpaid intern, did not receive compensation from the center, and thus did not qualify as an employee protected under Title VII. The decision was upheld on appeal.

Oregon Labor Commissioner Brad Avakian told the Associated Press that interns had contacted his office looking for help in the past and “we had to tell them that the law did not protect them.”

Under the measure, an intern who alleges workplace harassment or discrimination, among other violations, can bring a lawsuit against the employer or file a formal complaint with the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries.

Avakian said the idea for the bill came from a legislative intern at the Bureau of Labor and Industries. He said the intern discovered the loophole and brought it to his attention.  In 2011, a similar bill failed to gain traction. This year, however, the bill passed with broad support from civil rights groups and a student advocacy group.

The Oregon law  does not create an employment relationship and does not affect wage or workers’ compensation laws.

 Photo by: John Amis

 

 

“Bullying” and Assertive Women

The New York Times paints a daunting picture of “volatile”  New York City Council Speaker Christine C. Quinn, who is running for mayor.

 The Times describes an incident in which Ms. Quinn expressed her dismay to the city’s former Public Advocate Betsy Gotbaum for what she deemed to be Gotbaum’s failure of leadership at a chaotic council meeting. The Times said Quinn slammed her hand on the table and said, “You were like Bambi in there!” (Ms. Quinn says she told the Public Advocate that she had an expression of “Bambi-like eyes.”) Gotbaum called it “unprofessional behavior.”

 Before bestowing the mantle of  Workplace Bully on Ms. Quinn, I think it is appropriate to  consider how much of Ms. Quinn’s notoriety is due to the fact that she is a woman running for mayor of New York City.

There is a serious dearth of women in leadership roles in our society. As noted in Forbes Magazine , men run roughly 97% of the nation’s  largest public companies, hold 84% of major corporate board positions and control 83% of Congress.  Sex discrimination is alive and well.

And the media have a long history of savaging assertive women. Think Eleanor Roosevelt, Hillary Clinton in the ‘90s, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi, singer Madonna, Martha Stewart, … even one-time Tea Party diva Sarah Palin.   Woman who seek power often  are magnets for  barbs like the ones the Times story throws at Quinn – brash, angry,  controlling, temperamental, surprisingly volatile, retaliated, screaming, “hair trigger eruptions of unchecked, face-to-face wrath,” etc.?

Plus it is hard imagine any candidate  making gains  in the rough and tumble  of the New York City mayoral race without sharp elbows.

 “I don’t think being pushy or bitchy or tough, or however you want to characterize it, is a bad thing,” Quinn is quoted as stating. “New Yorkers want somebody who is going to get things done.”

There also is an interesting paradox in the Times article.   Workplace bullies often reveal themselves first to their staff and subordinates. The Times writes that members of Quinn’s staff are “strikingly loyal, with close advisers staying by her side for years.”   That says something about Ms. Quinn.

Quinn may be the bully who is portrayed in the Times article but for now  I’m reserving judgment.

Employer gets Immunity from Class Action

boardroom

Workers this week suffered another  potentially devastating blow when an influential appellate court ruled in Parisi v. Goldman Sachs & Co, that a former managing director could not file a class action lawsuit against  Goldman Sachs for sex discrimination because she had signed a contract agreement to arbitrate employment disputes.

The decision by the  Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York creates a scenario that  allows a savvy employer to class-action proof itself.

The appellate court ruled that Lisa Parisi, a former managing director of Goldman Sachs, could not sue the company in a class action because she agreed to submit all employment disputes to binding arbitration when she signed a “managing director” agreement in 2003.  Since the “managing director” agreement is  silent as to class actions,  Parisi must proceed to arbitration  on an individual basis. Bottom line: Parisi can’t sue in class action and she can’t arbitrate in class action.

 Parisi, who was fired in 2008,  alleged Goldman Sachs conducted a “pattern and practice” of sex discrimination against top female employees in violation of Title VII of  the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) and the New York City Human Rights Law.  She said she could not proceed in arbitration with a class action claim without Goldman Sachs permission and thus was effectively being denied her right to sue the company for systemic sex discrimination.. In other words, she said the arbitration clause in her  agreement must be invalidated because arbitration would preclude her from vindicating a statutory  right to file a “pattern and practice” class action lawsuit.

The appellate court agreed with Goldman Sachs that no substantive statutory right exists for employees to pursue a class action “pattern-or-practice” claim.

The court’s decision reversed two earlier decisions by a federal magistrate and a  district court judge who both denied Goldman Sach’s motion to compel arbitration in the case.

 The ruling  is a  boon to employers who are prescient enough to force new hires or employees who are being promoted to sign over-reaching binding arbitration clauses;  it  effectively negates the possibility that the employee will participate in a costly class action lawsuit down the road.   

Goldman Sachs took the position that it could not be sued by Parisi in federal court because of the arbitration clause, and it could not be compelled to defend a class action suit in arbitration because the arbitration clause in the agreement Parisi signed  was silent as to the arbitration of class claims.

Goldman Sachs is not entirely of the woods. Parisi filed the class action lawsuit along with two other Goldman Sachs employees,  Shanna Orlich, an associate, and H. Christina Chen-Oster, a vice president, who reportedly did not sign binding arbitration agreements with Goldman Sachs and presumably could proceed without Parisi.

Parisi’s employment agreement  contained an  arbitration clause in which she agreed  to arbitrate any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or based upon or relating to “Employment Related Matters.”  The agreement defined  “employment related matters” are defined as “matters arising out of or relating to  or concerning this Agreement, your hire by or employment with the Firm or the termination thereof,  or otherwise concerning any rights, obligations or other aspects of your employment relationship in respect of the Firm.”

 The appellate court reasoned that  the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act as establishing a “federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”  It also cited an earlier ruling in which the appeals court  concluded that in Title VII jurisprudence “pattern-or-practice” simply refers to a method of proof and does not constitute a “freestanding cause of action.”  Chin v. Port Authority of New York, 685 F.3d 135, 148 (2d Cir. 2012).

The arbitration clause in question states the Plaintiffs claims will be “finally settled by arbitration in New York City before, and in accordance with the rules . . . of, the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (“NYSE”) or . . . the  National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”). If both the NYSE and NASD decline  to arbitrate the matter, the matter will be arbitrated before the American Arbitration Association  (“AAA”) in accordance with the commercial arbitration rules of the AAA. You agree that any  arbitration decision and/or award will be final and binding.”

Goldman’s appeal was supported by briefs from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association. Parisi had support from the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund and the National Women’s Law Center.

The case is Parisi v. Goldman Sachs & Co, 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, No. 11-5229.